Decision-making during gambling: an integration of cognitive and psychobiological approaches by Clark, Luke
Review
Decision-making during gambling: an
integration of cognitive and
psychobiological approaches
Luke Clark*
Department of Experimental Psychology, Behavioural and Clinical Neuroscience Institute,
University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge CB2 3EB, UK
Gambling is a widespread form of entertainment that may afford unique insights into the interaction
between cognition and emotion in human decision-making. It is also a behaviour that can become
harmful, and potentially addictive, in a minority of individuals. This article considers the status of
two dominant approaches to gambling behaviour. The cognitive approach has identiﬁed a number
of erroneous beliefs held by gamblers, which cause them to over-estimate their chances of winning.
The psychobiological approach has examined case-control differences between groups of pathologi-
cal gamblers and healthy controls, and has identiﬁed dysregulation of brain areas linked to reward
and emotion, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and striatum, as well as altera-
tions in dopamine neurotransmission. In integrating these two approaches, recent data are discussed
that reveal anomalous recruitment of the brain reward system (including the vmPFC and ventral
striatum) during two common cognitive distortions in gambling games: the near-miss effect and
the effect of personal control. In games of chance, near-misses and the presence of control have
no objective inﬂuence on the likelihood of winning. These manipulations appear to harness a
reward system that evolved to learn skill-oriented behaviours, and by modulating activity in this
system, these cognitive distortions may promote continued, and potentially excessive, gambling.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The term gambling refers to a form of entertainment
where a wager, typically a sum of money, is placed
on the uncertain prospect of a larger monetary out-
come. As a form of recreation, gambling has been
widespread for several centuries, and across many
cultures (Raylu & Oei 2004b). The 2007 British
Gambling Prevalence Survey found that 68 per cent
of respondents reported gambling at least once in the
past year, and 48 per cent reported gambling on
games other than the state lottery (Wardle et al.
2007). To economists and psychologists, the popular-
ity of gambling represents an enduring paradox, as the
vast majority of gamblers are well aware of the popular
saying ‘the house always wins’. This refers to the fact
that gambling odds are carefully arranged to ensure a
steady proﬁt for the bookmaker, casino or slot machine;
somethingthatcanonlybeachievedattheexpenseofthe
gambler. In economic terms, the expected value of gam-
bling is negative, such that an accumulating debt is
inevitable over a large number of trials. Thus, the wide-
spread tendency to accept such gambles may provide
some useful insights into the mechanisms of human
irrationality. However, in addition to the ﬁnancial
considerations, it is probable that gambling is also
motivated by cognitive and emotional factors. Unpre-
dictable monetary wins are a potent form of positive
reinforcementthatstrengthentheinstrumentalresponse.
Gambling is associated with physiological arousal that is
manifested in heart rate increases and elevated cortisol
levels (Anderson & Brown 1984; Meyer et al.2 0 0 4 ).
Environmental cues (e.g. ﬂashing lights, the chime of
coins) that are associated with this arousal become con-
ditioned stimuli via Pavlovian processes. Gambling may
also serve to alleviate unpleasant states of boredom,
anxiety or low mood (i.e. negative reinforcement).
These emotional learning mechanisms will play a key
role in shaping gambling behaviour (Blaszczynski &
Nower 2002).
Gambling is also a behaviour that can spiral out of
control in some individuals. As gambling becomes
excessive, there are observable harms including debt,
illegal activity and interpersonal conﬂict. In its most
extreme form, pathological gambling is a recognized
psychiatric diagnosis in the Diagnostic and statistical
manual, version 4 (text revision) (DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association 2000), with a preva-
lence of around 1 per cent (Petry et al. 2005). The
severity of gambling involvement is thought to lie on
a continuum, and the label of ‘problem gambling’
is used to denote the less severe form. The US
prevalence of problem gambling is estimated
between 1 and 4 per cent (Shaffer et al. 1999; Welte
et al. 2002).
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gambling within the impulse control disorders, a hetero-
geneous ‘rag-bag’ of conditions that also includes
kleptomania (compulsive stealing) and trichotillomania
(compulsive hair-pulling). Accumulating data point to
are-alignmentofpathologicalgamblingwithintheaddic-
tions (Potenza 2006). The diagnostic criteria themselves
were closely modelled on the features of substance
dependence, and there is evidence of cravings (Tavares
et al. 2005), withdrawal symptoms (Wray & Dickerson
1981)andtoler ance(Grifﬁths1993b)insev eregamblers.
Inadditiontoclinicalphenomenology,severalotherlines
of evidence indicate aetiological overlap between pro-
blem gambling and drug addiction: there is substantial
comorbidity between the conditions (Petry et al. 2005),
sharedgeneticliability(Slutske et al. 2000),andprospec-
tive data identify personality traits that predict the
development of both problem gambling and substance
use disorders (Vitaro et al. 1999; Slutske et al. 2005).
T h ec r i t i c a ld i f f e r e n c ei st h a tp r o b l e mg a m b l i n gd o e s
not involve the ingestion of a psychoactive substance.
Long-term drug administration causes an array of
changesinthebrain,sothatincurrentusers,itisdifﬁcult
to disentangle the mechanisms by which the addiction
developed. As a putative ‘behavioural addiction’, pro-
blem gambling may represent a model for studying
addictionvulnerability, in brainsthat are not confounded
by the damaging effects of drugs (Bechara 2003).
Research into gambling behaviour can therefore
address two broad issues. First, given the general
prevalence of this behaviour, what does gambling tell
us about the fallibility of decision-making mechanisms
in the healthy human brain? Second, from a clinical
perspective, how does this common recreational
behaviour become dysfunctional? An overarching
theory of gambling should be able to explain both its
general popularity, and its potential to become patho-
logical. The aim of the present article is to integrate
two approaches to gambling behaviour that have
gained considerable popularity in recent years, but
which are rarely linked and command quite separate
research literatures. The cognitive approach empha-
sizes thought content and a distorted appraisal of
control during gambling. The psychobiological
approach assumes a disease model of problem gam-
bling, and has sought to identify group differences
between pathological gamblers and healthy controls
on measures of brain chemistry and brain function.
I will provide an overview of the current status of each
approach, before reviewing recent ﬁndings that suggest
a synthesis of the two approaches may be warranted.
2. THE COGNITIVE APPROACH
The cognitive formulation of gambling argues that the
problem gambler continues to play because they possess
distortedbeliefsaboutgamblingthatcausethemtoover-
estimate their chances of winning (Ladouceur & Walker
1996). Several kinds of erroneous beliefs have been
identiﬁed (Toneatto et al. 1997; Raylu & Oei 2004a),
which ultimately give rise to an ‘illusion of control’
where the gambler confuses a game of chance with a
game of skill (Langer 1975; Thompson et al.1 9 9 8 ).
In games where there is some genuine skill involvement,
such as blackjack, the gambler comes to believe that
skill is excessively inﬂuential (Ladouceur & Walker
1996). In believing that they are acquiring the necessary
skills to win (or even that such skills exist in principle),
the gambler is able to justify continued play.
Much of the evidence for the cognitive approach
has used the ‘think aloud’ procedure developed by
Gaboury & Ladouceur (1989). In this paradigm, the
gambler is asked to verbalize all thoughts during a
brief period of gambling in a naturalistic setting,
such as a casino. They are encouraged to speak con-
tinuously and to avoid censoring their speech. Their
speech output is recorded by the experimenter, and
statements are categorized subsequently as accurate
(e.g. ‘It’s a machine, we have no control over it, it’s
all luck’) or erroneous (‘I’m getting good at this
game. I think I’ve mastered it’; Ladouceur & Walker
1996). In regular gamblers, around 70–80% of stra-
tegic statements about the game were erroneous,
with similar ﬁgures obtained in slot-machine players
and roulette players (Gaboury & Ladouceur 1989;
Walker 1992). High rates of erroneous thoughts were
even present in players who were clearly aware that
the outcomes were determined by chance, given their
responses on a questionnaire administered before
and after the gambling session.
While these erroneous thoughts are evident in infre-
quent and controlled gamblers, one tenet of the
cognitive approach is that cognitive distortions are
exacerbated in problem gamblers, and are used to justify
ongoing excessive play (Ladouceur & Walker 1996). A
number of studies support this (Walker 1992; Grifﬁths
1994; Baboushkin et al. 2001; Joukhador et al. 2003).
Using the think-aloud procedure, Grifﬁths (1994)
found that regular (at least once per week) fruit machine
players reported more erroneous thoughts than non-
regular players (less than once per month). Baboushkin
et al. (2001) found that university students classiﬁed as
probable pathological gamblers on the widely used
South Oaks gambling screen (SOGS; Lesieur &
Blume 1987) reported more erroneous thoughts
during computerized games of roulette, blackjack and
a slot machine. In addition, a programme of research
by Ladouceur et al. (2002) has shown efﬁcacy of a
form of cognitive therapy for pathological gambling
that aims to correct these erroneous beliefs.
At a psychological level, it is important to under-
stand how these faulty beliefs develop, in both
occasional and problem gamblers. There appear to
be at least two mechanisms at work. On the one
hand, humans are generally poor at processing prob-
ability and judging randomness. On the other hand,
various features of gambling games directly foster
these distorted beliefs. It is widely accepted that
humans are highly error-prone at judging probabilities
(Gigerenzer 2002). Classic studies from experimental
psychology show that people are poor at generating,
and recognising, random sequences, such as the
outcomes of a series of coin tosses (Tversky &
Kahneman 1971; Wagenaar 1972). Subjects prefer
sequences without long runs of the same outcome,
and with balanced overall frequencies of heads and
tails. This may arise because subjects fail to appreciate
the independence of turns, and expect small samples
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are drawn (Wagenaar 1988). Impaired processing of
randomness may give rise to the ‘Gambler’s Fallacy’,
where the gambler believes that a win is ‘due’ after a
series of losses. Cohen (1972; cited in Ladouceur &
Walker 1996) looked at betting strategies in roulette
players as a function of the previous outcome. Players
were more likely to bet on black if the previous outcome
was red (75%) than if the previous outcome was black
(50%). In a study of university students choosing lottery
tickets, it was shown that players preferred tickets of
apparently random numbers over tickets containing
consecutive numbers (14–19), clusters of numbers
(e.g. six numbers between 20 and 30), and numbers
involving patterns (16–21–26–31–36–41; Hardoon
et al. 2001). Recent work in sport fans has also looked
at winning and losing ‘streaks’, arguing that most
people perceive a ‘streak’ on the third consecutive win
or loss event (C a r l s o n&S h u2 0 0 7 ).
In addition to these generic difﬁculties in processing
chance, various features of gambling games (referred
to as ‘structural characteristics’) promote gambling
(Grifﬁths 1993a), potentially via the promotion of
cognitive distortions. As a simple example, slot-
machine wins are routinely accompanied by bright
ﬂashing lights and loud noises. Wagenaar (1988)
suggested that this sensory stimulation fuels an ‘avail-
ability heuristic’, where the gambler can more easily
recall past wins than past losses. By distorting their
memory of past outcomes, this may bias the decision
to continue play. In the next sections, we focus on
two further structural characteristics that appear to
manipulate the player’s perceptions of winning in a
particularly profound manner.
(a) Personal control
Personal control refers to the gambler’s level of invol-
vement in arranging their gamble. On a game of
chance, the gambler is equally likely to win if they
arrange their gamble, or if another agent places the
gamble for them. For example, in a lottery, one’s
favourite numbers are as equally likely to win as a
‘lucky dip’ ticket. However, it has been reliably
observed across many forms of gambling that players
have inﬂated conﬁdence when they are given the
opportunity to arrange the gamble themselves. In a
seminal study by Langer (1975), subjects were invited
to buy a lottery ticket, and the experimenter later
asked to buy back their ticket. Subjects who were
initially able to choose their ticket from a bag
demanded more money ($9) to exchange compared
with a group who were allocated a ticket at random
($2). In a follow-up experiment, subjects who had
chosen their ticket were more likely to refuse a swap
for a ticket in a second lottery with a higher chance
of winning. This illustrates how perceived control can
actually cause subjects to reject a genuine opportunity
to increase their chances of winning.
Similar ﬁndings have been reported in craps and
roulette. In craps, gamblers play in a team where they
take turns to throw the dice (‘shooting the dice’) onto
the craps table. They can place bets on certain numbers
being rolled, on any player’s throw including their own.
Regular craps players display a range of superstitious
behaviours when throwing the dice, such as blowing
on the dice, and using more force in their hand move-
ments when trying to throw a high number (Henslin
1967). Consistent with an effect of personal control,
when it is a player’s turn to shoot the dice, they are
more likely to place a bet, place higher bets, and place
more risky bets compared with when other players are
shooting (Davis et al.2 0 0 0 ). Similarly, a study of rou-
lette players found that higher bets were placed when
the player was given the opportunity to throw the rou-
lette ball, compared with trials where the experimenter
acted as a croupier and threw the ball (Ladouceur &
Mayrand 1987). In each of these examples, the pres-
ence of personal control has no effect whatsoever on
the likelihood of winning.
(b) The near-miss effect
Near-misses occur when an unsuccessful outcome is
proximal to a win. They occur across all forms of gam-
bling, such as when a slot-machine payline displays
two cherries with the third cherry just coming into
view. Near-misses are salient events to the gambler.
Reid (1986) found that in student volunteers watching
a computerized horse-race, races with a close neck-to-
neck ﬁnish were rated as ‘better’ than races with a clear
winner from early on. Gamblers often interpret near-
misses as evidence that they are mastering the game,
and in this sense, near-misses appear to foster an illu-
sion of control. As a consequence of the near-misses,
the gambler feels that he is ‘not constantly losing but
constantly nearly winning’ (Grifﬁths 1991).
A number of research studies have investigated the
behavioural effects of near-miss outcomes on gambling
play. In the ﬁrst study of its kind, Strickland & Grote
(1967) used a slot-machine simulation where the three
reels stopped sequentially. The reels contained red and
green stimuli, and wins were awarded for three reds.
One group of subjects played a game where the chances
of a red icon appearing on reels 1–3 was 70, 50 and
30 per cent, and hence there was a high likelihood of
a near-miss. A second group played the same game
but with reels 1 and 3 reversed, so that it was evident
early on that the trial was a loss. The actual proportion
of wins was matched across the two groups. Subjects in
group 1 were seen to play for signiﬁcantly longer than
subjects in group 2. More recent studies have begun
to systematically manipulate the frequencies of near-
misses. Cote et al. (2003) assigned two groups of
subjects to play a slot machine that either delivered no
near-misses or a moderate (27%) frequency of near-
misses. Subjects in the near-miss condition played
signiﬁcantly more trials on the game. A similar study
compared three machines with 15, 30 and 45 per cent
frequencies of near-misses, and reported an ‘inverted
U’ effect with maximal persistence in the intermediate
group (Kassinove & Schare 2001). Clearly, the potency
of near-misses is diminished if they are over-represented,
rather like ‘crying wolf’.
(c) Summary
The cognitive approach argues that gambling behaviour
is maintained by erroneous beliefs and cognitive
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that gamblers perceive the expected value of gambling
as positive, when in fact, the objective expected value
is negative. The approach is not without its critics,
who have argued that the think-aloud procedure is
overly intrusive, that ﬂippant verbalizations do not
necessarily reﬂect cognitions held with conviction,
and that there are only a limited number of ways that
subjects can express accurate cognitions about
chance and randomness during a period of gambling
play (Dickerson & O’Connor 2006). Nevertheless,
the cognitive approach has considerable explanatory
power: this framework can capably explain the general
prevalence of gambling as erroneous cognitions and
inaccurate perceptions of randomness are common in
infrequent gamblers. The cognitive framework can
also explain the process by which gambling becomes
pathological as problem gamblers are hypothesized to
make more erroneous cognitions (or to have greater
conviction in those beliefs, or to be more inclined to
use their faulty beliefs to justify continued gambling).
There is some evidence for this hypothesis using the
think-aloud procedure (Walker 1992; Grifﬁths 1994;
Baboushkin et al. 2001), although there is minimal
work speciﬁcally comparing personal control or
near-miss effects between problem and non-problem
gamblers. In testing these ideas, one complexity is
that cognitive distortions in regular gamblers can be
highly idiosyncratic (Delfabbro 2004), such that a
gambler may view many outcomes as ‘near-misses’
that would appear ‘full-misses’ to a non-gambler.
3. THE PSYCHOBIOLOGICAL APPROACH
The psychobiological approach attempts to identify
differences in aspects of brain function between
groups of individuals with and without gambling prob-
lems. Studies can be divided into those measuring
neurotransmitter function, and those measuring the
activity or integrity of different brain areas. The latter
approach can be subdivided into neuropsychological
studies, which measure brain function indirectly
using tasks validated in patients with brain injury,
and functional imaging studies, which measure brain
activity directly during task performance, typically
with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
(a) Neurochemical studies
Studies of neurotransmitter function in gamblers have
focussed on the monoamines, dopamine, serotonin
and noradrenaline, which are known to play key roles
in arousal, motivation and higher cognitive functions
(see Robbins 2000 for a review). It is difﬁcult to
measure neurotransmitter levels directly in the
human brain. Instead, a number of studies have
measured peripheral markers in urine, plasma or cere-
brospinal ﬂuid (CSF). These studies reported
increases in markers of noradrenaline function (Roy
et al. 1988; Bergh et al. 1997), reductions in markers
of serotonin function (Nordin & Eklundh 1999) and
alterations in dopamine function (Bergh et al. 1997;
Meyer et al. 2004). The study by Bergh et al. (1997)
reported a decrease in CSF dopamine, coupled
with increased levels of the dopamine metabolite,
homovanillic acid, from CSF samples obtained in the
clinic. The study by Meyer et al. (2004) measured
dopamine and noradrenaline levels in plasma during
a period of casino gambling in problem and non-pro-
blem gamblers. Problem gamblers showed greater
increases in both noradrenaline and dopamine levels
during casino gambling for real money, compared
with a laboratory gambling session for points reward.
Thus, the direction of effect—for dopamine changes
in particular—remains unclear, and ﬁndings from per-
ipheral markers must be treated with caution as their
relationship with central activity is complex.
Another indirect approach has been to study genetic
variants that are thought to affect neurotransmitter
function. For example, the dopamine D2 receptor
gene displays a common polymorphism (TaqIA,
occurring in A1 and A2 alleles) that inﬂuences D2
receptor density in the brain, and is linked to the
prevalence of alcohol and stimulant addictions
(Noble 2000). Studies by Comings et al.( 1996,
1999) reported changes in DRD2 and DRD4 poly-
morphism frequencies in groups of pathological
gamblers, compared with the age, gender and
race-matched non-gamblers. The reported TaqIA
association (increased prevalence of the A1 allele) is
consistent with reduced D2 receptor binding in the
striatum in pathological gamblers (Pohjalainen et al.
1998). Genetic studies have also indicated effects on
other genotypes affecting serotonin and noradrenaline
function (Comings et al. 2001). However, this ﬁeld has
been plagued by failures of replication, and a recent
study in siblings discordant for pathological gambling
(140 pairs) indicated a signiﬁcant association with
the DRD1 gene but failed to support the DRD2
association (da Silva Lobo et al. 2007).
At least two other lines of evidence converge on the
ﬁnding that dopamine transmission is altered in prob-
lem gambling. A number of case reports have
described impulse control disorders, including prob-
lem gambling, in patients with Parkinson’s disease,
where the primary neuropathology is degeneration of
the dopamine system. The emergence of these impulse
control disorders appears to be linked to treatment
with dopamine agonist medications (Weintraub et al.
2006), and in particular, to two drugs, pramipexole
and ropinirole, that have a relatively high afﬁnity for
the dopamine D3 receptor (Dodd et al. 2005). The
emergence of pathological gambling has been linked
to earlier age of onset of the Parkinson’s Disease,
comorbid or familial alcoholism, and elevated trait
impulsivity and sensation-seeking scores (Voon et al.
2007). However, it is unclear how the primary pathol-
ogy in Parkinson’s Disease interacts with the action of
the medication.
Second, studies by Zack & Poulos (2004, 2007)
have looked at the effects of dopamine challenge in
problem gamblers, on aspects of gambling behaviour.
Their ﬁrst experiment used amphetamine, an indirect
dopamine agonist that also increases noradrenaline
transmission. Amphetamine increased motivation
to gamble and facilitated the reading of gambling-
relevant words in problem gamblers. Their follow-up
study used the more selective dopamine D2 receptor
antagonist haloperidol, but unexpectedly reported
322 L. Clark Review. Decision-making during gambling
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010)similar effects to amphetamine: haloperidol increased
motivation to gamble and primed gambling-relevant
words as well as increasing heart rate responses
during a period of slot-machine play. While this study
supports the role of the dopamine D2 receptor in
gambling behaviour, the direction of effect is problem-
atic from a treatment perspective, as both an indirect
agonist (amphetamine) and a selective antagonist (halo-
peridol) increased gambling tendencies. It is possible
that low doses of a dopamine receptor antagonist act
preferentially on presynaptic autoreceptors to increase
dopamine function (Moghaddam & Bunney 1990;
Frank & O’Reilly 2006), and that higher doses of the
antagonist would be needed to reduce dopamine
transmission.
In summary, neurochemical studies of problem
gambling have taken a number of indirect approaches
to the measurement of neurotransmitter function.
There are preliminary indications of changes in sero-
tonin and noradrenaline function (see also Potenza
2008), and indeed, much reason to think that other
transmitters like glutamate may be dysregulated
(Grant et al. 2007). The most consistent ﬁnding at
the current time is for dysregulation of dopamine func-
tion in problem gamblers, although the direction and
precise mechanisms of this effect remain unclear.
(b) Neuropsychological studies
In a comprehensive review of studies that used clinical
neuropsychological tests, Goudriaan et al. (2004)
concluded that there was little evidence for impair-
ment in language, perception, intellectual function,
and memory in problem gamblers. In contrast, several
studies have detected impairments on traditional tests
of frontal lobe function; namely, the Wisconsin card
sort test, which requires the subject to perform
abstract rule shifts, and the Stroop test, which requires
the subject to override the automatic tendency to read
colour words in order to name the colour of the ink
that the word is printed in (Goudriaan et al. 2006a;
Kalechstein et al. 2007; Forbush et al. 2008; Marazziti
et al. 2008). At an anatomical level, these tasks are
reasonably coarse, and performance on the Wisconsin
card sort test may also be disrupted by posterior corti-
cal lesions (Anderson et al. 1991). Neuropsychological
probes that are more selectively associated with the
dorsal aspects of the prefrontal cortex, like self-ordered
(strategic) working memory tests, are not reliably dis-
rupted in problem gamblers (Goudriaan et al. 2006a;
Leiserson & Pihl 2007; Lawrence et al. 2009). Patho-
physiology in the dorsal frontal region may only be
present in the most severe pathological gamblers,
such as Blaszczynski & Nower (2002) ‘antisocial
impulsive’ gamblers.
Neuropsychological measures of impulsive or risky
decision-making have revealed more consistent deﬁ-
cits, resembling the effects seen in patients with
damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), who often display real-life difﬁculties with
ﬁnancial decision-making. This syndrome was initially
measured using the Iowa gambling task (IGT; Bechara
et al. 1994), where subjects make a series of card
choices from four decks (A, B, C, D) that win and
lose sums of hypothetical money. Unbeknownst to
the subject, decks A and B are ‘risky’, associated
with large wins but larger losses that incur gradual
debt. Decks C and D are safe decks that yield smaller
wins but with negligible losses. While healthy subjects
develop a preference for the safe decks over 100 trials,
patients with vmPFC damage maintain a preference
for the risky decks, accumulating considerable debt.
Similar performance has been reported in at least
ﬁve studies of pathological gamblers to date (Petry
2001b; Cavedini et al. 2002; Goudriaan et al. 2006a;
Forbush et al. 2008; Roca et al. 2008).
These ﬁndings have been corroborated using other
tasks of risky decision-making (Brand et al. 2005;
Lawrence et al. 2009) and delay discounting (Petry
2001a), which are also linked to vmPFC integrity
(Mobini et al. 2002; Clark et al. 2008). The studies
by Cavedini et al. (2002) and Lawrence et al. (2009)
report impairment in risky decision-making in pro-
blem gamblers in the presence of intact executive
ability (on the Wisconsin card sort test and spatial
working memory, respectively), supporting the asser-
tion that vmPFC pathophysiology is a more
consistent marker in problem gambling. There is a
concern that gamblers’ performance on these tasks of
risk-taking and decision-making may be distorted by
their extensive experience with monetary rewards, jud-
ging probabilities, and by their erroneous cognitions
related to gambling. This would compromise a strict
neuropsychological account of their deﬁcits in terms
of underlying brain dysfunction. However, these con-
cerns are mitigated in studies showing comparable
neurocognitive effects across problem gamblers and
substance addictions (Petry 2001a; Lawrence et al.
2009; notably, patients with alcohol dependence
were also impaired on tests of working memory func-
tion that were spared in the problem gamblers
(Lawrence et al. 2009)). Nonetheless, there is a real
need for studies looking at the impact of cognitive dis-
tortions upon these simpliﬁed neuropsychological tests
of gambling behaviour, and to corroborate ﬁndings
with psychophysiological measures of emotion and
motivation, such as skin conductance responses
(Goudriaan et al. 2006b).
(c) Functional neuroimaging studies
In recent years, several studies have compared brain
responses in groups of problem gamblers and healthy
controls during various cognitive tasks. In the ﬁrst
studies of their kind, Potenza and colleagues scanned
male pathological gamblers and male healthy controls
during performance of the Stroop colour–word
interference task (Potenza et al. 2003a) and during
presentation of videos of an actor-narrated gambling
scenario (Potenza et al. 2003b). This latter ‘cue-
induction’ procedure reliably elicits cravings in drug
users. In both studies, the gamblers displayed
decreased activation in the vmPFC region compared
with the controls. In the cue-induction study, the PG
group showed additional decreases in the striatum
and thalamus. This diminished neural response to cue-
induction might be considered surprising, given the
elevated subjective reports of craving in these subjects.
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videos against nature videos found increases in brain
activity in pathological gamblers, in several regions
including the right dorsolateral PFC (Crockford et al.
2005). Differences in the exact cue-induction pro-
cedure or patient characteristics may underlie these
discrepancies.
Blunted activity in the vmPFC and striatum has
been reported in subsequent studies. Reuter et al.
(2005) compared brain activity during a card-guessing
task in male pathological gamblers and healthy
controls. The contrast of monetary wins minus
monetary losses revealed a robust response (detectable
at the single-subject level) in the ventral striatum and
vmPFC. This response was attenuated in the
gamblers, and these reductions were signiﬁcantly
correlated with SOGS gambling severity. The authors
interpret their ﬁnding as consistent with a ‘reward
deﬁciency’ hypothesis that has been applied to drug
addiction (Bowirrat & Oscar-Berman 2005): gamblers
may be motivated to gamble to stimulate a develop-
mentally underactive brain reward system. This kind
of hypothesis assumes that the monetary wins are rein-
forcing in pathological gambling, and a positron
emission tomography study in seven pathological
gamblers conﬁrmed increases in striatal glucose
metabolism following blackjack play for real money
compared with scans performed after a blackjack
session for points only (Hollander et al. 2005). Unfor-
tunately, this study did not include a healthy control
group for comparison. Reduced vmPFC activity was
also reported in a study of substance-dependent prob-
lem gamblers as well as in substance-dependent
non-gamblers, performing the IGT in the scanner
(Tanabe et al. 2007). Pathological gamblers also
showed diminished activity in the lateral sector of the
ventral PFC, in response to both monetary wins and
losses in a reversal learning task, in a recent study by
de Ruiter et al. (2009).
Thus, there is some consistency in the observation
of blunted ventral frontal cortex and striatal activation,
across tasks of reward processing and decision-making
(see also Potenza 2008). However, these ﬁndings must
be treated as preliminary due to the small sample
sizes, ranging from seven gamblers in the Hollander
et al. (2005) study, to 19 in the de Ruiter et al.
(2009) study. Further targets for research in this area
also represent issues for the neurochemical and neuro-
psychological studies. First, the psychobiological
approach has predominantly used the case-control
design to compare groups of severe pathological gam-
blers against healthy non-gamblers, but there is a large
spectrum of gambling involvement (and gambling
harm) that lies between these two groups, and it is
necessary to systematically assess the impact of gam-
bling severity on markers of brain function. Second,
there has been minimal consideration of sources of
variability such as gender, psychiatric comorbidities,
or preferred forms of gambling. For example, motiv-
ations to gamble may differ between players of
different games: casino and sports betting gamblers
may be driven predominantly by the excitement of
gambling (i.e. positive reinforcement) whereas
slot-machine gamblers may play to alleviate negative
mood states such as boredom, stress or depression
(i.e. negative reinforcement; Cocco et al. 1995).
These differences are likely to moderate the neural
correlates of reinforcement processing in problem
gamblers.
4. ANOMALOUS RECRUITMENT OF THE BRAIN
REWARD SYSTEM DURING COGNITIVE
DISTORTIONS
The cognitive and psychobiological accounts are rarely
linked in the research literature, partly because of
some key differences in approach and methodology.
Cognitive studies of gambling frequently use non-
gamblers or infrequent players (often university
students), and place considerable emphasis on testing
in naturalistic settings (e.g. a casino). In contrast, the
psychobiological studies derive from a medical model
of problem gambling, and have compared pathological
gamblers who are typically in treatment, against
healthy non-gamblers. In neuropsychological and
functional imaging studies, the testing procedures are
inherently laboratory based, and some studies have
called into question the ecological validity of labora-
tory gambling, particularly where hypothetical points
are involved instead of real money (Anderson &
Brown 1984; Meyer et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the
two approaches are not mutually exclusive: cognitive
distortions must be instantiated at the neural level,
and individual differences in brain function or neuro-
chemistry may plausibly inﬂuence one’s susceptibility
to developing erroneous beliefs about gambling.
In linking the two positions, let us start by consider-
ing the role of money. At a psychological level, money is
a potent reward. More precisely, money is a conditioned
reinforcer, meaning that it is not innately rewarding, but
that its value is acquired through extensive pairing with
primary rewards and through vicarious, cultural learn-
ing. Neurobiological ﬁndings indicate the existence of
a specialized brain reward system that processes
reinforcers and uses reinforcement to guide future
decision-making (‘reinforcement learning’). At an ana-
tomical level, fMRI studies demonstrate the central
roles of the ventral striatum and the mPFC in this
brain reward system; these regions are activated by
monetary wins (Delgado et al. 2000; Breiter et al.
2001; Knutson et al.2 0 0 3 ) as well as primary rewards
like fruit juice (Berns et al.2 0 0 1 ) or chocolate (Rolls &
McCabe 2007).
At a neurochemical level, the mesolimbic dopamine
projection from the midbrain to the striatum and PFC
is also central to neurobiological accounts of reward
processing (Wise 2004). A dominant hypothesis is
that dopamine cells code a reward prediction error:
the difference between the obtained and the expected
reward (Schultz 2002; Montague et al. 2004). Electro-
physiological recording from non-human primates has
shown phasic bursts of dopamine cell activity in
response to unexpected rewards (a positive prediction
error). As the monkey learns to associate a conditioned
stimulus (CS; e.g. a light) with later reward delivery,
dopamine ﬁring shifts to the onset of the CS, and dis-
appears at the time of reward itself; as the reward is
now predicted, the prediction error is minimal.
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reward then withheld, the dopamine cells show a pause
in ﬁring at the expected time of reward delivery (i.e. a
negative prediction error). These observations have
fuelled sophisticated computational models of
reinforcement learning and decision-making based
on the calculation of prediction errors (e.g. McClure
et al. 2003; Daw et al. 2006).
Real-world tasks such as gambling games are more
complex than the Pavlovian and instrumental con-
ditioning tasks performed by experimental animals.
Recent work has begun to indicate that activity
within the brain reward system is modulated by some
of the psychological manipulations that affect gam-
bling behaviour. Our own work has focussed on the
near-miss effect, using a gambling task based on a
two-reel slot machine (see ﬁgure 1; Clark et al.
2009). The right-hand reel is spun so that the volun-
teer can either win £0.50p (if the two reels align) or
not win anything; there are no losses in the task. In a
study in 15 healthy volunteers with minimal involve-
ment in gambling, the fMRI contrast of wins minus
non-wins identiﬁed brain responses across established
parts of the brain reward system, including the ventral
striatum, medial PFC, anterior insula, thalamus and
the dopaminergic midbrain (see ﬁgure 2a(i),(ii)).
Critically, the non-win outcomes could be further
distinguished as ‘near-misses’ (where the reel stopped
one position either side of the payline) and ‘full-
misses’ (where the reel stopped more than one position
away from the payline). Within the network of win-
sensitive areas, the direct contrast of near-misses and
full-misses revealed signiﬁcant and bilateral activation
of the ventral striatum and anterior insula by near-
miss outcomes (see ﬁgure 2b). Thus, although
the objective outcomes were identical on these trial
types (i.e. both non-wins), the brain responded to
the near-misses in a way that was comparable to the
response to a monetary win. This ‘anomalous’
activation may underlie the invigorating effects of
near-miss outcomes on gambling play in the studies
discussed above by Cote et al.( 2 0 0 3 )and Kassinove &
Schare (2001).
The slot-machine task was also designed to elicit a
second cognitive distortion, of personal control: on
half the trials, the subject was required to choose one
of six icons on the left-hand reel as a ‘play icon’. The
subject won if the right-hand reel stopped on that
chosen icon. On the remaining trials, the computer
chose the play icon and the subjects made a motor
response to conﬁrm selection. Ratings data taken on a
trial-by-trial basis revealed greater conﬁdence (‘How
do you rate your chances of winning?’) on subject-
chosen trials compared with computer-chosen trials,
consistent with an illusion of control.
Similar manipulations of personal control have been
studied in previous neuroimaging experiments, and
show a modulation of brain activity at the level of the
dorsal striatum and medial PFC (O’Doherty et al.
2004; Tricomi et al. 2004; Walton et al. 2004; Yeung
et al. 2005). Notably, the ventral striatum appears to
respond to reward regardless of the level of control
(O’Doherty et al. 2004). The experiment by Tricomi
et al. (2004) used an oddball task, where in one
condition, monetary wins and losses were delivered
at a ﬁxed delay after a predictive stimulus. In the
second condition, the volunteer was told that a
choice response (left or right) would inﬂuence whether
they won or lost money (in fact, the outcomes were
ﬁxed). The dorsal striatum was selectively activated
by monetary wins under the choice condition. The
study by Yeung et al. (2005) measured event-related
potentials during a similar task, and reported greater
feedback negativities, which are thought to derive
from a medial frontal locus, when outcomes appeared
contingent upon the volunteer’s choices, compared
with when outcomes required no active choice
(see also Walton et al. 2004).
In our fMRI study of the slot-machine task, we were
unable to detect any differences between monetary wins
arising from participant-chosen versus computer-
chosen gambles. However, there was a signiﬁcant
interaction between the manipulation of personal con-
trol and the near-miss effect, in the medial PFC
(speciﬁcally, in the rostral anterior cingulate cortex;
see ﬁgure 2c). A similar interaction was evident in
behavioural data from a larger group of university
students (n ¼ 40): on participant-chosen trials, near-
misses increased ratings of ‘How much do you want
to continue to play the game?’ compared with full-
misses. On computer-chosen trials, the opposite
effect was observed. Why would near-misses be more
no win
total: £0
Figure 1. The slot-machine task uses two-reels, with the
same six icons displayed on each reel, and a horizontal
‘payline’ across the centre of the screen. On trials with a
white screen background, the volunteer selects one ‘play
icon’ on the left reel, using two buttons to scroll through
the icons, and one button to select. On trials with a black
screen background, the computer selects the play icon. Fol-
lowing icon selection, the right-hand reel spins for a variable
duration (2.8–6 s), and decelerates to a standstill. During
outcome (4 s), if the right reel stopped on the selected icon
(i.e. matching icons displayed in the payline), the subject
was awarded £0.50; all other outcomes won nothing.
Following the outcome phase, there was an inter-trial inter-
val of variable duration (2–7 s). In the fMRI version of the
task, two ratings were taken on intermittent (1/3) trials: fol-
lowing selection, subjects were asked ‘How do you rate your
chances of winning?’, and following outcome, subjects were
asked ‘How much do you want to continue to play the
game?’. Reprinted from Clark et al. (2009).
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Presumably, our volunteers appraised the near-misses
as evidence that they were mastering the game; such
appraisals of skill acquisition would be more likely on
trials with direct control over gamble selection. The
observation of this same interaction in the medial
PFC response implicates this region in appraising illu-
sory control. The differential roles of the medial PFC
and dorsal striatum in these experiments remain
unclear, but one possibility is that medial PFC is pref-
erentially recruited when the task appears to require
the identiﬁcation of higher-order structure (Hampton
et al. 2006), such as identifying stimuli that are more
likely to win in future. The dorsal striatum may
signal lower-order associations of motor responses
and outcomes.
The dorsal striatum is also known to be involved in
the formation of habits, and this role has generated
considerable interest in the context of drug addiction.
For example, studies in experimental animals have
given rise to the hypothesis that the neural regulation
of drug taking progresses from the ventral striatum to
the dorsal striatum as the initial recreational
consumption of drugs (e.g. for their hedonic effects)
develops into habitual and compulsive usage (Everitt &
Robbins 2005). As supporting evidence for this role
of the dorsal striatum in drug addiction, rodent studies
have shown that inactivation of the dorsolateral
striatum (by infusion of gamma-aminobutyric acid
agonists) prevented context-induced reinstatement of
cocaine seeking in withdrawn animals (Fuchs et al.
2006). Changes in dopamine function in the dorsal
striatum are observed after chronic, but not acute,
cocaine self-administration (Porrino et al. 2004).
Whether this progression would also occur in a form
of ‘behavioural addiction’ like problem gambling,
where there is no drug involved, is unknown. As such,
processes of habit formation and dorsal striatal function
in problem gamblers represent an important target for
future research that may answer broader questions of
relevance to drug addiction.
The neuroimaging ﬁndings reviewed above suggest
that gambling games harness a brain reward system
that has evolved to learn about skill-oriented
behaviours: situations where response feedback can be
used either to improve the precision of the motor
response itself, or to improve the prediction of future
outcomes. This system often responds inappropriately
under conditions of chance. Using the example of the
near-miss, in many real-world situations such as target
practice or getting to the railway station two minutes
late, it is advantageous for the brain to assign value to
near-miss outcomes, as they are a valid and useful
signal of future success. However, in gambling games,
where winning outcomes are largely or purely deter-
mined by chance, near-misses provide no information
on future success, and it is misleading for the brain to
assign them value. Similarly, in the case of personal
control, it is obviously adaptive for the brain to learn
how to control its environment, and specialized and
sophisticated processes have evolved to identify rewards
that occur contingently upon behaviour. However, the
random nature of gambling games means that the
availability of personal control has no actual bearing
on the likelihood of a win occurring.
These data showing modulation of striatal and
medial PFC activity by near-misses and personal con-
trol are from studies in healthy volunteers, who had
low levels of gambling involvement. The ﬁndings
therefore suggest that the brain reward system is natu-
rally susceptible to these cognitive distortions
associated with gambling. Nonetheless, the neuropsy-
chological and functional imaging data described in
the previous sections indicate substantial changes in
the functionality of this system in problem gamblers,
along with alterations in dopamine transmission. By
the reasoning I have outlined above, the observed
reductions in ventral striatum and vmPFC activity
(Potenza et al. 2003a; Reuter et al. 2005)m a yb e
only part of the story. Under conditions of cognitive
distortion, it is hypothesized that these regions would
be excessively recruited in pathological gamblers. We
are testing this prediction in ongoing work.
In conclusion, the data outlined above suggest that
two of the better-established cognitive distortions in
gambling behaviour, the near-miss effect and the effect





Figure 2. Coronal sections through the brain showing
(a(i)(ii)) the contrast of monetary wins minus non-win
outcomes, at y ¼ 4 (ventral striatum) and y ¼ 34 (medial
prefrontal cortex), thresholded at p , 0.05 corrected with
family-wise error. (b) The contrast of near-miss outcomes
minus full-miss outcomes, within regions sensitive to monet-
ary wins, at y ¼ 4 (ventral striatum; thresholded at t ¼ 3.0 to
better display extent of activation). (c) the interaction
between near-miss outcomes (i.e. near-misses minus full-
misses) and personal control (participant-chosen trials
minus computer-chosen trials), within regions sensitive to
monetary wins, at y ¼ 34 (medial prefrontal cortex; thresh-
olded at t ¼ 3.0 to better display extent of activation). Data
redrawn from Clark et al. (2009).
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The term ‘anomalous’ is justiﬁed by the objective status
of near-misses as loss events that do not signal future
success, and the objective irrelevance of personal control
to gambling success on games of chance. This mechan-
ism is unlikely to represent the only interface between
the cognitive and psychobiological approaches to gam-
bling, and recent neuroimaging work has highlighted
several other possible avenues. For example, there are
emerging links between chasing behaviour, which is
often viewed as the ﬁnal common pathway in problem
gambling, and impaired recruitment of cortical brain
regions involved in conﬂict monitoring and inhibitory
control (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al. 2008; de Ruiter
et al. 2008). The perception of patterns (or ‘streaks’)
within random sequences, fuelling a Gambler’s Fallacy,
has received little attention in the neuroimaging
ﬁeld, but is also likely to involve interactions between
the frontal lobes and the striatum (Elliott et al. 2000).
There is a need to develop better tasks to capture
these cognitive distortions in the scanner, and it is
encouraging that studies in irregular and non-gambler
samples seem able to detect variability in these distor-
tions at a neural level (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al.
2008; Clark et al. 2009). The longer-term objective
here is to understand how this neural circuitry changes
in the transition from recreational gambling to problem
gambling. In order to achieve this target, there is also an
urgent need for longitudinal designs that follow
gamblers as they move in and out of problematic
levels of gambling involvement.
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